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Abstract
Is knowledge definable as justified true belief (“JTB”)? We argue that one can legitimately
answer positively or negatively, depending on how the notion of justification is understood. To
facilitate our argument, we introduce a simple propositional logic of reason-based belief. We
show that this logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various useful features, including
quantification over reasons. We use our framework to contrast two notions of JTB: one inter-
nalist, the other externalist. We argue that Gettier cases essentially challenge the internalist
notion but not the externalist one. In particular, we may equate knowledge and JTB if the
latter is grounded in what we call “adequate” reasons.
1 Introduction
Can the ordinary concept of knowledge be defined in terms of justified true belief (“JTB”)? Since
Gettier’s paper [10], the answer to this question is widely considered negative. Gettier produced
two cases intended to show that a belief can be true, justified, and yet fall short of knowledge. The
first concerns Smith, an applicant for a job who has “strong evidence” that Jones is the man who
will get the job and also that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Unknown to Smith, it turns out
that Smith himself has ten coins in pocket and is actually the one selected for the job. Smith’s
belief that “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” is therefore true and justified,
but it seems inappropriate to say that this belief constitutes knowledge. The second case is one
in which Smith believes a false proposition p based on persuasive evidence for p and infers from p
some true proposition p ∨ q by picking the true disjunct q at random. Here too, Smith justifiably
believes p ∨ q, but it seems incorrect to say that he knows p ∨ q.
Our point of departure in this paper is the following: even though we agree with the force
of Gettier’s examples, we think the notion of justification remains insufficiently analyzed, both in
Gettier’s original paper and in most discussions that have followed.1 What Gettier’s examples show
∗Funded by Programs ANR-10-LABX-0087 IEC, ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL* and by the ANR project “Triva-
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1A notable exception is the analysis in the Justification Logic literature: [2, 3] uses a formal framework to track
what goes wrong with specific lines of reasoning in the examples of Gettier, Goldman, and Kripke; and [4, 5] uses a
related framework that has additional features from Belief Revision Theory to reason about the examples of Lehrer
and Gettier. Our work here is different. First, while inspired by the Justification Logic approach to reasoning about
justifications, our setting is in many respects simplified but at the same time includes certain novel features (see §2.4
for details). Second, our task here is different than that in [2, 3]: beyond providing a formal diagnosis of what goes
wrong in certain Gettier-type examples, we define different kinds of JTB and discuss their relative susceptibility to
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is that an agent can have a plausible internal justification for believing a proposition without that
justification being properly adequate to the truth of the proposition in question. But if so, Gettier
cases must only show that knowledge is not identical with JTB under an internalist conception of
justification. The examples do not thereby rule out the existence of a more externalist notion of
justification capable of sustaining the equation between knowledge and JTB. Define knowledge as
true belief with adequate justification, and it appears Gettier cases no longer have a bite.
Admittedly, this definition might not provide a noncircular or reductive analysis (see [17]): the
notion of “adequacy” may ultimately have to be understood in ways that presuppose a prior grasp
of the concept of knowledge. For example, if an adequate justification were to mean “a justification
that is suitable to make the belief count as knowledge,” then it would appear that we define
knowledge in terms of itself. We agree with this objection, but the notion of adequacy may also
turn out to not depend on epistemic notions. Adequacy, for instance, may turn out to be definable
in terms of truth-making, and the truth-making relation need not refer to prior epistemic notions.
Or consider the relation between a fully formalized axiomatic proof and a mathematical statement
derived in that proof: the “adequacy” of the proof as a vehicle for mathematical truth is a purely
syntactic notion, with no epistemological concepts presupposed. These examples suggest to us that
room remains for a fruitful investigation of the concepts of knowledge, belief, and justification that
acknowledges the distinction between adequate and inadequate reasons.
In this paper, our main goal is to clarify this duality in the concept of justification and show
precisely what role it plays in Gettier-type examples. The gist of our account, therefore, lies in
the distinction between reasons that (merely) support belief in a proposition and reasons that are
not only supportive but are also what we call adequate. In order to articulate this distinction, we
present the Logic of Reason-Based Belief in §2. This logic provides an explicit representation of
reasons to believe a proposition. We show that the logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate
quantifiers over reasons, limited or full closure of reason-based belief under implication, and an
optional requirement that all beliefs be reason-based. In §3, we put this logic to work in the
analysis of Gettier cases: first to tease apart two notions of justification, one internalist and the
other externalist; and second to study the susceptibility of internal JTB and of external JTB to
Gettier-type examples. We close the paper with a puzzle about whether knowledge ought to hold
in cases in which an agent possesses several reasons for a proposition, some adequate and others
inadequate. Technical notions and results that are not required for an understanding of the main
text are relegated to an appendix.
2 A Simple Logic of Reason-Based Belief
We distinguish between two kinds of reasons: those that merely “support” a proposition by inclining
an agent to believe in it, and those that not only support a proposition but are also themselves
“adequate.” Our analysis of Gettier cases hinges on a precise understanding of this key distinction.
Accordingly, our task in this section is to introduce a simple theory of reason-based belief in which
we formalize this distinction.
An important caveat is that we do not attempt to resolve the notion of “adequate reason” into
more basic concepts. One might wish, for instance, to analyze adequacy in terms of reliability, in
terms of counterfactual sensitivity, or in terms of other concepts. We deliberately avoid such an
such examples. This has some similarities with the work in [4, 5]; however, our logics are much simpler and we use
them as part of a different analysis.
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analysis in this paper. Instead, we merely have a primitive to express that “reason r is adequate,”
though we require that adequacy of r implies “veridicality” of r (i.e., that r only supports true
things). In so doing, we commit ourselves to the idea that adequacy forces truth (see [1]). However,
reasons can be veridical without being adequate, a fact that will be essential to our account of
Gettier cases.
2.1 Reason-Based Belief
Fix nonempty sets P of propositional letters and R of reason symbols (also called “reasons”).2 F
is the set of formulas ϕ defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | (r :ϕ) | r | Bϕ
p ∈ P , r ∈ R
Other Boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations.
• r :ϕ says, “r is a reason to believe ϕ.”
Sometimes it will be convenient to read r :ϕ as “r supports ϕ.” The two readings of r :ϕ
will be used interchangeably, so that “support” of a formula has an implicit direct connection
with having a reason to believe the formula.
• r says, “r is an adequate reason.”
Our logic will guarantee that every proposition supported by an adequate reason is true (i.e.,
we will have r :ϕ→ (r → ϕ) for all formulas ϕ).
• Bϕ says, “the agent believes ϕ.”
The formula Br is therefore read, “the agent believes r is an adequate reason.” Sometimes
it will be convenient to say that “the agent accepts reason r” to mean that Br holds. So
believing reason r is adequate and accepting reason r will be considered to mean the same
thing.
To reduce the number of parentheses while ensuring unique readability of formulas, we adopt the
convention that the colon operator binds more strongly than any Boolean connective. For example,
r :ϕ→ ψ denotes (r :ϕ)→ ψ
[
and not r : (ϕ→ ψ)
]
.
The theory RBB of Reason-Based Belief appears in Table 1. We write ⊢ ϕ to mean that ϕ is
deriavable in RBB. The negation is written 0 ϕ.
Regarding the axioms and rules of RBB from Table 1, (CL) and (MP) say that RBB is an
extension of classical propositional logic. (RK) says that reasons are closed under material impli-
cation, and (RN) says that reasons support all derivable formulas. (A) says that if r is a reason to
believe ϕ and r is an adequate reason, then ϕ is true. (RB) says that if r is a reason to believe ϕ
and the agent believes that r is an adequate reason, then the agent believes ϕ. (D) says that the
agent’s beliefs are consistent: she cannot have contradictory beliefs (i.e., believe both ϕ and ¬ϕ for
2Whether P and R are taken to be disjoint is up to the user of our system: if they are not disjoint, then some
propositional letters are also reasons; if they are disjoint, then propositional letters and reasons are distinct objects.
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Axiom Schemes
(CL) Axiom Schemes of Classical Propositional Logic
(RK) r : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (r :ϕ→ r :ψ)
(A) r :ϕ→ (r → ϕ)
(RB) r :ϕ→ (Br→ Bϕ)
(D) Bϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ
Rules
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
ψ
(MP)
ϕ
r :ϕ
(RN)
ϕ↔ ψ
Bϕ↔ Bψ
(E)
Table 1. The theory RBB
some ϕ). Finally, (E) says that the agent’s beliefs do not distinguish between provably equivalent
formulas.
As for mnemonics, (CL) is “Classical Logic,” (MP) is “Modus Ponens,” (RK) is Kripke’s axiom
K of modal logic (used here for reasons), (RN) is “Reason Necessitation,” (A) is “Adequacy,” (RB)
is “Reasons to Beliefs,” (D) is a well-known axiom from modal logic [7], and (E) is a well-known
rule from minimal modal logic [7].
Some useful terminology: given a reason r and a formula ψ to be used as an assumption
describing the key features of a particular situation of reason-based belief, to say
• “r is adequate (assuming ψ)” means ⊢ ψ → r;
• “r is veridical for ϕ (assuming ψ)” means ⊢ ψ → (r :ϕ→ ϕ); and
• “r is veridical (assuming ψ)” means ⊢ ψ → (r :ϕ→ ϕ) for each formula ϕ.
Within the confines of a given discussion in which the above terminology is used, the assumption ψ
will generally be clear from context or else immaterial (i.e., one may take an arbitrary ψ). Therefore,
the parenthetical expressions in the above terminology are generally omitted when the terminology
is actually used. Note that ψ may also be the trivial assumption ⊤ (i.e., a fixed propositional
tautology such as p ∨ ¬p for some fixed p ∈ P ). One clarification before we proceed: it follows by
(A) that every adequate reason is veridical; however, a veridical reason is not necessarily adequate
(i.e., the set {¬r} ∪ {r :ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ ∈ F} is consistent with RBB).
A semantics for RBB is presented in §A.1. It is shown in Theorem A.1 that RBB is sound and
complete for this semantics.
2.2 Weak Belief But Strong Reasons
RBB posits an extremely weak notion of belief. In particular, beliefs are not necessarily closed
under material implication. That is, it is consistent to have
B(ϕ→ ψ) ∧Bϕ ∧ ¬Bψ ,
which says that the agent believes an implication and the antecedent of the implication but not
the consequent. Further, there is no principle of RBB that guarantees us a minimum collection of
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beliefs that the agent will hold. Indeed, we might think of (RB) as the main route for determining
what it is that the agent believes, but even this principle requires an additional assumption that
the reason in question is believed to be adequate. So, like all other axioms and rules that have
something to say about belief, (RB) tells us that a belief obtains only if we already assume some
other belief is already present. As a result, our theory allows for the possibility that the agent has
no beliefs whatsoever : the set
{¬Bϕ | ϕ ∈ F}
that collects together all statements of non-belief is consistent with our theory. So RBB does not
require that the agent have any beliefs. But whenever she does, they are consistent by (D), they do
not distinguish between provable equivalence by (E), and they encompass all supported assertions
of a believed reason by (RB). But no further restrictions are placed on the notion of belief. Belief
is therefore governed by the minimal modal logic ED [7].
Reasons, on the other hand, are fairly strong. First, they encompass all derivable statements
by (RN). Second, they are closed under implication (and hence under (MP)) by (RK). Third, if
adequate, then (A) says that they are veridical : everything they support is true. Reasons therefore
support many assertions (infinitely many, in fact, because each reason supports each of the infinitely
many theorems of RBB by (RN)). This puts more requirements on reasons (i.e., they must do more
things), which makes them stronger. Reasons are governed by what is essentially the normal
multi-modal logic KT (with one modal operator “ r : ” for each reason r), except that the T axiom
r :ϕ → ϕ (sometimes called “veridicality”) is not guaranteed to hold unless, according to (A), we
make the additional assumption that r is adequate. This way of having a multi-modal logic like
KT but with the “modal operator” r itself a formula (whose truth implies veridicality) is, to our
knowledge, new.3
We have chosen a theory of weak belief but stong reasons in order to keep things as simple as
possible but still address some of the major trends in the epistemological study of knowledge as
justified true belief (“JTB”). In all of the examples from epistemology we consider in this paper, we
need some way to track an agent’s logical inferences and some way to link these inferences to what
the agent believes. Our theory RBB is a simple and minimalistic way of doing just this: reasons are
used to handle the relevant inferencing, the agent can “accept” a reason (or not) by believing it to
be adequate (or not), the agent comes to believe things supported by reasons she accepts, and the
agent’s beliefs are always consistent. This way we can encode inferencing using a reason, indicate
whether the agent accepts this inferencing, and thereby infer whether she believes some statement
based on a reason. We also allow the possiblity that she believes something without a reason, by
which we mean that the set
{Bϕ} ∪ {r :ϕ→ ¬Br | r ∈ R}
is consistent with our theory. Accordingly, we can separate out reason-based beliefs from those
not coming from any reason, and we can use the inferencing apparatus of reasons to characterize
3The usual way of writing our formula r :ϕ would be ✷rϕ. So RBB is just a multi-modal logic with an extra
formula r for each r ∈ R, a K-modality “ r : ” (our variant of ✷r) for each r ∈ R that respects the reflexivity
scheme T if r holds (as per (A)), and an ED-modality B that is linked to the other modalities via scheme (RB).
According to our intended semantics (§A.1), we interpret modal operators using a possible worlds semantics (with
a neighborhood function for B), and the intended interpretation of the formula r is that the binary accessibility
relation corresponding to the modal operator “ r : ” is reflexive. Certain hybrid logics [6] can express reflexivity of
modal operators: the formula ↓x.¬✷r¬x says that the accessibility relation corresponding to ✷r is reflexive. However,
hybrid logics generally include additional features permitting greater expressivity than we need.
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the key features of a number of important epistemological examples. And all of this is done in a
simple, minimalistic setting.
2.3 Consistency of Reasons
One interesting theorem of RBB is the principle
⊢ (Br ∧Bs)→ (r :ϕ→ ¬s :¬ϕ) (RC)
of reason consistency. This principle says that if an agent believes reasons r and s are adequate,
then r and s cannot support contradictory assertions. Intuitively, the derivability of (RC) follows
because (RB) requires that an agent who believes a reason also believes everything that the reason
supports and (D) requires that an agent not have contradictory beliefs. Notice that if we take r = s
in (RC), then we obtain a statement provably equivalent to
⊢ Br → (r :ϕ→ ¬(r :¬ϕ)) , (IC)
which says that a reason believed to be adequate is internally consistent.
If the agent does not believe r is a adequate reason, then r can be internally inconsistent (i.e.,
we can have that r is a reason to believe both ϕ and ¬ϕ for some formula ϕ). Put another way,
the formula
¬Br ∧ r :ϕ ∧ r :¬ϕ
is consistent with our theory. Similarly, if the agent believes r is an adequate reason but does not
believe s is an adequate reason, then our theory does not rule out the possibility that r and s are
inconsistent. That is,
Br ∧ ¬Bs ∧ r :ϕ ∧ s :¬ϕ
is also consistent with our theory.
Finally, since the theory RBB is consistent (and hence does not prove both ϕ and ¬ϕ for some
formula ϕ),4 any adequate reason is internally consistent. That is,
⊢ r :ϕ→ (r → ¬(r :¬ϕ)) , (AIC)
which says that a reason r that supports ϕ and is adequate cannot also support ¬ϕ. It follows from
(AIC) that any internally inconsistent reason is not adequate.
2.4 Logical Closure and Combination of Reasons
If ψ is a logical consequence of ϕ, meaning ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then our theory says that r is a reason to
believe the consequent ψ whenever r is a reason to believe the antecedent ϕ. That is,
⊢ ϕ→ ψ implies ⊢ r :ϕ→ r :ψ . (RCLC)
The proof: from ϕ → ψ, we obtain r : (ϕ → ψ) by (RN). This is the antecedent of an instance of
(RK), so the consequent r :ϕ → r :ψ of this instance is derivable by an application of (MP). This
4Consistency of RBB follows by soundness (Theorem A.1).
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completes the proof. In examining this proof, we see that (RCLC) is a consequence of the stronger
logical principle encompassed by our axiom
r : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (r :ϕ→ r :ψ) , (RK)
which says that reasons are closed under material implication.
The principle (RCLC) says that reasons are closed under logical consequence. It is unclear
whether this is a desirable principle. For example, it may make more sense to say that if ψ is a
logical consequence of ϕ and r is a reason to believe ϕ, then it is not r itself that is a reason to
believe the consequence ψ. Instead, what is wanted is some more complicated reason r′ that not
only references r but also provides some reason s as to why ψ obtains from ϕ. That is, we might
seek a principle like this:
s : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (r :ϕ→ (s · r) :ψ) . (App)
This is the principle of Application from Justification Logic [3]. It says: if s is a reason to believe
the implication ϕ→ ψ and r is a reason to believe the antecedent ϕ, then a new object s ·r obtained
by combining s and r is a reason to believe the consequent ψ. In essence, the more complex reason
s · r keeps track of everything we would need to check to see that ψ indeed obtains: the initial
reason r for the antecedent ϕ and a reason s for the implication ϕ → ψ. Further, the syntactic
structure of s · r, with s to the left and r to the right, tells us what kind of a reason we have:
based on the form of (App), it is suggested that s is some implication, r is the antecedent of that
implication, and s · r is a reason for the consequent. In essence, we are describing specific witnesses
for an instance of the rule (MP) of Modus Ponens:
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
ψ
(MP) is encoded by
s r
s · r
.
(App) is a more nuanced version of (RK): if we have r : (ϕ → ψ) and r :ϕ, then we do not
obtain r :ψ straightaway using (App). Instead, we must construct the reason r · r in support of
ψ. The single instance of “ · ” in the syntactic structure of the latter reason reflects our use of one
derivational step (i.e., one instance of (MP)) to obtain ψ.
To do away with (RCLC), we must do away with (K) and modify (RN). In particular, let R0
be a nonempty set of “basic” reasons, define R to be the smallest extension of R0 satisfying the
property that s, t ∈ R implies s · t ∈ R, replace scheme (K) by scheme (App), and restrict (RN) by
requiring that r ∈ R0. (It is assumed that all other schemes and rules can use reasons coming from
the full set R.) Call the resulting theory RBB+(App). In RBB+(App), it is consistent to have
r : (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ r :ϕ ∧ ¬(r :ψ) , (1)
which says that r is not closed under implication. As a result, it can be shown that (RCLC) no
longer obtains. But note that (RK) and (RCLC) do not fail in RBB+(App) because logical or
materially implied consequences of assertions are no longer “accessible” by some reason. Indeed, in
the situation (1) under the theory RBB+(App), the logical consequence ψ of ϕ is still “accessible”
by the reason r ·r. However, this reason r ·r is more “complex” than the original reason r (in terms
of the number of instances of the (MP)-encoding Application operator “ · ” that appear inside it).
In general, distant consequences that would require many repetitions of (App) are still accessible;
it is just that the reasons that access these consequences may be very “complex.”
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Justification Logic (JL) [3] is the study of logics of reason-based belief (with reasons thought of
as “justifications”). Defining JL0 to be the fragment of RBB+(App) obtained by omitting all belief
formulas and belief axioms from the theory, Justification Logics may be thought of as extensions
of JL0.
5 Many JLs permit other kinds of combinations of reasons than what we saw with (App).
Our logic RBB is closely related to the JL tradition, though we conspicuously omit (App), retain
(K) (and thereby endorse (RCLC)), leave (RN) without the additional restriction, and maintain a
set R of primitive reasons that cannot be combined to form more complex reasons. In so doing, we
lose the ability to have the syntactic structure of reasons reflect the structure of derivations in the
theory, and thereby forgo a more nuanced tracking of the interaction between logical consequence
and the complexity of reasons. We accept these consequences in the interest of developing a system
that is simple and yet still of use to the formal epistemologist. Nevertheless, we recognize that a
reader may be interested to see a thorough study of more sophisticated extensions of our theory
that allow for the combination of reasons along the lines of (App) (and perhaps for other features
as well). We advise such a reader to consult the JL literature directly [3].
Since our theory does not allow the agent to combine reasons in the sense of (App) and beliefs
are not closed under implication, it is consistent for us to have a situation wherein the agent has
the requisite information to draw a belief but simply does not draw it. For example, assuming
s 6= r, it is consistent to have
Bs ∧Br ∧ s : (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ r :ϕ ∧ ¬Bψ , (2)
which says that the agent believes the reason s supporting an implication is adequate (and hence
the agent believes the implication), the agent believes the reason r supporting the antecedent is
adequate (and hence the agent believes the antecedent), and yet the agent does not believe the
consequent (even though she believes the implication and its antecedent). The problem is that her
beliefs are not closed under (MP). This is so despite the fact that, by (RCLC) and (RB), beliefs
coming from the same reason are closed under (MP):
⊢ (Bt ∧ t : (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ t :ϕ)→ Bψ .
So long as the implication and its antecedent come from separate beliefs as in (2), the agent need
not believe the consequent.
The consistency of (2) is a consequence of our design: we use reason operators to encode
inferencing, and we use belief operators to encode the particular inferencing and the individual
assertions that the agent accepts (in terms of her affirmed beliefs). As such, the situation (2) is
one in which the agent has not yet performed sufficient inferencing to accept the conclusion ψ,
even though she is very close (after all, she has done enough to accept the implication ϕ→ ψ and
its antecedent ϕ). In essence, this lack of closure allows us to place one kind of constraint on the
agent’s inferencing powers. If desired, one can place even more severe constraints as in [5]; however,
this seems to require more syntax and additional axioms. One can also go the other way and lift
these constraints entirely; in §2.5 we will suggest one natural way to do this in our setting. But for
now we retain what we hope is a “happy medium” in the form our theory RBB.
5Actually, Justification Logics are extensions of a fragment of RBB+(App) that places further restrictions on the
rule (RN), but we set aside further discussion of this issue here.
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2.5 Implication-closed and Purely Reason-Based Beliefs
We saw in (2) that reason-based beliefs in RBB need not be closed under implication if the source
reasons are different. If we would like to ensure that reason-based beliefs are always closed under
implication, even if the beliefs come from separate reasons, then a simple solution is to introduce
a “master reason” σ that encodes the combined information of all reasons the agent accepts. This
requires us to expand our reason set R to include a new symbol σ not already present and then
add the following additional schemes to RBB:
(MA) σ → (Br → r)
(MB) Bσ
(MR) r :ϕ→ (Br → σ :ϕ)
(MA) says that every accepted reason is adequate if the master reason is adequate, (MB) says that
the agent always believes the master reason, and (MR) says that anything supported by a reason
that the agent believes is also supported by the master reason. Adding these principles makes
it so that σ is the sum of the agent’s evidence. Calling RBBσ the theory obtained from RBB by
expanding the set R of reasons to include a new symbol σ and adding (MA), (MB), and (MR), it
follows that
RBBσ ⊢ (Bs ∧Br ∧ s : (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ r :ϕ)→ Bψ . (RCL2)
Indeed, if the agent believes the reason s supporting an implication is adequate and the agent
believes the reason r supporting the antecedent is adequate, then it follows by (MR) that σ supports
the implication and its antecedent. Therefore, by (RK) and (MP), σ supports the consequent. But
the agent believes σ to be adequate by (MB), and therefore it follows by (RB) that the agent
believes the consequent. It is in this sense that the agent “combines” the information conveyed by
reasons she believes to be adequate into the master reason σ.
While we have shown that the RBBσ-agent may combine the information from two reasons to
derive her beliefs, there is no need to restrict the number of reasons to two. Indeed, according to
(MB), the agent implicitly combines into σ the information from every reason she believes to be
adequate, no matter how many of these there may be.
In RBBσ, the master reason σ serves as a witness for an existential quantifier over reasons that
the agent accepts (i.e., believes to be adequate).6 In particular, (MR) tells us that if there exists
an accepted reason r that supports ϕ, then σ supports ϕ. Hence by (MB), if there exists such an r,
then σ supports ϕ and is itself accepted. If we were to add quantifiers to the language (something
we do later in §2.6), we could express this as:
(∃r)(Br ∧ r :ϕ)→ (Bσ ∧ σ :ϕ) .
That is, if there exists an accepted reason that supports ϕ, then σ is a witness to the existential
quantifier.
Both RBBσ and the basic theory RBB allow for the possibility that the agent believes a formula
ϕ without any supporting reasons (i.e., she does not believe to be adequate any reason that supports
ϕ). This is the same as saying that the set
{Bϕ} ∪ {r :ϕ→ ¬Br | r ∈ R}
6Said precisely: σ is a Skolem constant for the existential quantifier over accepted reasons. See [16] or any book
on mathematical logic for details.
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is consistent with both RBBσ and RBB. If this situation is undesirable, then a simple remedy is
to extend the theory RBBσ by adding a principle that says all beliefs are supported by the master
reason:
(MT) Bϕ→ σ :ϕ
With (MT) in place, the agent believes only those things supported by σ and hence, by (MR),
she believes only those things supported by some reason. In short, every belief is “reason-based.”
Defining RBB+σ to be the theory obtained from RBBσ by adding (MT), it follows by (MT), (RB),
and (MB) that
RBB+σ ⊢ Bϕ↔ σ :ϕ ,
which says that the agent believes something just in case it is supported by the master reason.
But then belief can be conflated with the master reason. As a result, we have by (RCLC) that the
beliefs of the RBB+σ -agent are always closed under (MP). Belief in RBB
+
σ is therefore governed by
the normal modal logic KD.
Semantics for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ may be found in §A.2. It is shown in Theorem A.2 that each
of RBBσ and RBB
+
σ is sound and complete for its semantics.
2.6 Quantification Over Reasons
We have observed that the theory RBB does not require that every belief arise from a reason: it
is consistent with RBB for the agent to believe ϕ and yet have no reason r supporting ϕ that she
believes to be adequate. If we were to introduce quantifiers over reasons into our language, then
we could express this situation by saying that the following formula is consistent:
Bϕ ∧ (∀r)(r :ϕ→ ¬Br) .
Another example: we might like to say that r is the unique reason supporting ϕ that the agent
believes to be adequate:
r :ϕ ∧Br ∧ (∀s)((s 6= r ∧ s :ϕ)→ ¬Bs) .
To allow such expressions as formulas, we extend our set of formulas F to the larger set F ∀ consisting
of all formulas ϕ that may be formed by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | (r :ϕ) | r | Bϕ | r = r | (∀r)ϕ
p ∈ P , r ∈ R
We adopt usual Boolean connective abbreviations along with the following:
r 6= s := ¬(r = s)
(∃r)ϕ := ¬(∀r)¬ϕ
(∀r 6= s)ϕ := (∀r)(r 6= s→ ϕ)
(∃r 6= s)ϕ := (∃r)(r 6= s ∧ ϕ)
Note that in this language, an element r ∈ R can act both as a reason (as in the formula r : p)
and as a quantifier variable (as in the formula (∀r)(r : p)). Therefore, reasons may appear either
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bound or free in formulas, with the notion of bound and free defined in the usual way. For reasons
s and r and a formula ϕ, we say that s is free for r in ϕ to mean that r has no free occurrence in
ϕ within the scope of a quantifier (∀s). Put another way, if s is free for r in ϕ, then in the formula
ϕ[s/r]
obtained by substituting all free occurrences of r in ϕ by s, no newly replaced occurrence is bound.
Examples: s is free for r in (∀t)(t 6= r) but not in (∀s)(s 6= r).
The theory QRBB of Quantified Reason-Based Belief is defined in Table 2. (UD), (UI), and
(Gen) are standard principles of first-order quantification. (EP) and (EN) say that two reasons are
considered to be the same if and only if they are syntactically identical.
Axiom Schemes
(CL) Axiom Schemes of Classical Propositional Logic
(RK) r : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (r :ϕ→ r :ψ)
(A) r :ϕ→ (r → ϕ)
(RB) r :ϕ→ (Br→ Bϕ)
(D) Bϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ
(UD) (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ (∀r)ψ), where r is not free in ϕ
(UI) (∀r)ϕ→ ϕ[s/r], where s is free for r in ϕ
(EP) r = r
(EN) ¬(r = s), where r and s are syntactically different
Rules
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
ψ
(MP)
ϕ
r :ϕ
(RN)
ϕ↔ ψ
Bϕ↔ Bψ
(E)
ϕ
(∀r)ϕ
(Gen)
Table 2. The theory QRBB
It is shown in Corollary A.11 that for each ϕ ∈ F not containing quantifiers, we have QRBB ⊢ ϕ
if and only if RBB ⊢ ϕ. It is therefore unproblematic for us to simply write ⊢ ϕ to say that ϕ is
provable.
We can extend QRBB to the theory QRBBσ obtained by extending R to include a new master
reason σ and adding the schemes (MA), (MB), and (MR) for σ. We can further extend QRBBσ
to the theory QRBB+σ obtained by adding the additional scheme (MT) to guarantee all beliefs are
reason-based.
Semantics for QRBB, for QRBBσ, and for QRBB
+
σ may be found in §A.3. It is shown in Theo-
rems A.5 and A.12 that each of QRBB, QRBBσ, and QRBB
+
σ is sound and complete for its semantics.
However, for the completeness result, there is one caveat: our proof requires that the set R of reasons
be at least countably infinite.
3 Justified True Belief and Knowledge
We use our logical framework to tease apart two notions of justified true belief (henceforth “JTB”).
The first is an internalist notion, which Gettier showed was insufficient for knowledge. The second
is an externalist notion that we argue is immune to Gettier scenarios. After defining these two
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notions of JTB, we indicate their relationship and discuss whether external JTB might be a viable
candidate for knowledge.
3.1 Two Notions of Justification
In our theory, there are (at least) two natural ways to define JTB:
• JTBer(ϕ) := r :ϕ ∧Br ∧ r, and
• JTBir(ϕ) := r :ϕ ∧Br ∧ ϕ.
Both imply that the agent has a true belief that ϕ. However, JTBer(ϕ) suggests that the agent has
a true belief justified by an adequate reason, whereas JTBir(ϕ) suggests that the agent only has a
true belief justified by a prima facie reason (that may not be adequate). JTBer is thus externalist,
while JTBir is internalist.
Gettier’s achievement was to deny that JTBir(ϕ) is the same as knowledge of ϕ. For example,
if we assume that
r : p ∧Br ∧ (¬p ∧ q) , (G2)
then we have Gettier’s second case.7 In particular, since r is a reason to believe p, we have by
(RCLC) that r is a reason to believe p∨q. Since the agent believes r is an adequate reason, she will
believe both p and p ∨ q. But p is false and q is true. So, assuming she has no reason supporting
q that she believes is adequate, we are in a situation where she has a JTB of p ∨ q based solely
on a reason supporting the false disjunct p. As a result, Gettier and many others argue that the
agent does not know p ∨ q, even though she does have a JTB that p ∨ q (in the internal sense of
JTBir(p ∨ q)).
In contrast, if we assume that JTBer(p), which is
r : p ∧Br ∧ r , (G2′)
then, since r supports p, it also supports p ∨ q by (RCLC). But r is an adequate reason and
therefore both p and p ∨ q are true. Since the agent believes r is an adequate reason, she believes
both p and p ∨ q, and in this case her belief is based on an adequate (and hence veridical) reason.
In general, it is easy to see that JTBer(ϕ) satifies:
• ⊢ JTBer(ϕ→ ψ)→ (JTB
e
r(ϕ)→ JTB
e
r(ψ)),
which says that external JTB is closed under implication (if supported by a fixed reason r);
• ⊢ JTBer(ϕ)→ ϕ,
which says that external JTB is veridical;
• ⊢ JTBer(ϕ)→ (r :ψ → ψ),
which says that if an agent has an external JTB based on reason r, then r cannot support
any false assertions (so-called “false lemmas”); and
7This is the case where the agent “Smith” has a reason to believe p (“Jones owns a Ford”) and concludes p ∨ q
(“Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona”) on the basis of this reason; however, unknown to Smith, p is false
and q is true.
12
• ⊢ ϕ implies ⊢ (Br ∧ r)→ JTBer(ϕ),
which says that for provable ϕ, if the agent correctly believes that reason r is adequate, then
she will have external JTB of ϕ based on r.
In contrast, one can show that JTBir(ϕ) satisfies:
• ⊢ JTBir(ϕ→ ψ)→ (JTB
i
r(ϕ)→ JTB
i
r(ψ)),
which says that internal JTB is closed under implication (if supported by a fixed reason r);
• ⊢ JTBir(ϕ)→ ϕ,
which says that internal JTB is veridical;
• 0 JTBir(ϕ)→ (r :ψ → ψ),
which says that if an agent has an internal JTB based on reason r, then r might support false
assertions (so-called “false lemmas”); and
• ⊢ ϕ implies ⊢ Br → JTBir(ϕ),
which says that for provable ϕ, if the agent believes that reason r is adequate, then she will
have internal JTB of ϕ based on r (even if her belief is mistaken).
The differences between JTBer and JTB
i
r are in the last two properties. So we see that the main
difference between external and internal JTB is in the reliability of the reason on which the JTB
is based. External JTB requires that the reason cannot be faulty, whereas internal JTB merely
requires that the agent believe (correctly or not) that the reason is non-faulty.
Using our quantified language, we adopt the following abbreviations:
JTBe(ϕ) := (∃r)JTBer(ϕ) and JTB
i(ϕ) := (∃r)JTBir(ϕ) .
JTBe(ϕ) says that the agent has an external JTB for ϕ (based on some reason), and JTBi(ϕ) says
the same but for internal JTB.
3.2 Is Knowledge JTBe?
JTBi falls prey to Gettier’s examples because the supporting reason need not be veridical (i.e., it
admits “false lemmas”). JTBe, however, requires an adequate supporting reason, and hence this
reason is necessarily veridical (i.e., it admits “no false lemmas”). This suggests we examine the
equation
Kϕ := JTBe(ϕ) , (KJTBe)
which defines knowledge as external JTB. What should we think of this equation? Consider the
“fake barn county” situation [11]: the agent is in a county that has numerous fake barns that look
exactly like real barns. Not knowing she is in this county, she sees what she thinks is a barn and
concludes that it is indeed a barn. It turns out she is correct because, by chance, she happens to
be looking at the only real barn in the entire county. Obviously, she has an internal JTB that she
sees a barn, though most philosophers argue that she does not know she sees a barn.8 But does
8Intuitions about knowledge ascription in fake barn cases are notoriously less stable among philosophers than they
are in the original Gettier cases (see [12, 15, 9]). Here we are considering a situation in which the belief seems simply
“too lucky” to count as knowledge.
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she have an external JTB in this case? One reason to answer affirmatively: the agent’s reason is
veridical, unlike in Gettier’s original examples.9 However, veridicality does not imply adequacy.
Take r and p so that
r is read, “what the agent sees looks to her like a barn,” and
p is read, “what the agent sees is a barn.”
Our agent is in the situation:
r : p ∧Br ∧ p . (Barn)
That is, the claim that what the agent sees is a barn is supported by the reason r, which says that
what she sees looks like a barn; the agent believes that r is adequate to guarantee the truth of
what it supports; and the agent does actually see a barn. But is r in fact adequate? If we say it
is, then we run into the following problem: had the agent picked a different barn-looking structure
that turned out to be a fake, we would have
r : p ∧Br ∧ ¬p , (Barn′)
which implies that p is non-veridical, contradicting the assumed adequacy of r (since adequacy
implies veridicality). This suggests to us that r is not necessarily adequate; that is, each of (Barn)∧r
and (Barn)∧¬r is consistent with our intuitions about the “fake barn county” example. Conclusion:
the agent need not have external JTB in this case.
We take it that the “fake barn county” example seeks to challenge the agent’s acumen in
determining when it is safe to reason according to the principle
(what I see looks like an X)→ (what I see is an X) , (WSWG)
which has the colloquial reading “what I see is what I get.”10 Since adequacy implies veridicality,
one could use our notion of adequacy to indicate that the agent’s use of (WSWG) is licensed. In
particular, if we assume that (Barn) ∧ r, then we might construe this as a case in which the agent
is in “normal barn county” (where there are no fake barns) and so her use of (WSWG) is licensed:
r is an externally valid reason for the agent to infer that she sees a barn, so the agent knows that
she sees a barn. In contrast, if we assume that (Barn) ∧ ¬r, then we might construe this as a case
in which the agent is back in “fake barn county” and not licensed to draw the conclusion: r is not
an externally valid reason for her to infer that she sees a barn, so she does not know that she sees
a barn.
Zagzebski’s criticism of a JTB-based analysis of knowledge [18] might apply here: we either
must sever the link between truth and justification (thereby going so far as to concede that there
is knowledge in Gettier cases) or else assert that “there is no degree of independence at all between
truth and justification” (in order to avoid Gettier problems). Zagzebski’s position is that neither
horn of her dilemma is satisfactory, and so the proper way to avoid the dilemma is to reject the
possibility of analyzing knowledge in terms of JTB plus some extra component (i.e., reject the
9Veridicality is defined in §2.1. Our framework can distinguish three “types” of reasons: those that are non-
veridical (and hence inadequate), those that are veridical but inadequate, and those that are adequate (and hence
veridical). Gettier’s second case (G2) has reasons of the first type: non-veridical. The “fake barn county” case has
reasons of the second type: veridical but inadequate. And one might argue that a “normal barn county” variant of
“fake barn county” (in which there are no fake barns) has reasons of the third type: adequate.
10This diagnosis was suggested to the third author by Alexandru Baltag (private communication).
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“knowledge is JTB + x” approach all together); see also [17]. We accept that our approach is
close to endorsing the second horn of Zagzebski’s dilemma. However, by distinguishing adequacy
from veridicality, we can still maintain a notion of independence between truth and justification.
In particular, pace Zagzebski, our semantic analysis distinguishes between “adequate belief” (i.e.,
JTBe) and “lucky true belief” (i.e., JTBi).
3.3 No False Lemmas and The Problem of Mixed Reasons
So let us assume that our definition (KJTBe) of knowledge as external JTB is correct. Is it then
possible to define knowledge (i.e., external JTB) in terms of internal JTB plus some other condition?
Indeed it is:
⊢ JTBe(ϕ)↔ (∃r)(r ∧ JTBir(ϕ))
In words: to have external justification it is necessary and sufficient to have an adequate justification
that serves as the basis for an internal JTB.
However, this analysis immediately raises a concern regarding the force of the quantifier on the
right side of the equivalence. To appreciate the problem, it is worth reminding ourselves of one
of the first responses to Gettier’s examples: the so-called “no false lemmas” (hereafter “NFL”)
requirement (see [8]). The NFL requirement is meant to rule out situations like Gettier’s second
case, wherein the agent starts from a mistaken belief that p to obtain a correct belief that p ∨ q.
Thinking of the reasoning sequence of beliefs 〈p, p ∨ q〉 as a “proof,” the initial “lemma” (i.e.,
assumption) p is false, but then a perfectly legitimate inference step to a logical consequence p ∨ q
ends up on a formula that just so happens to be true.
In our framework, the obvious counterpart to the NFL requirement is the “no inadequate
lemmas” (henceforth “NIL”) requirement:
NIL(ϕ) := (∀s)(JTBis(ϕ)→ s) .
This says that every reason that supports an internal JTB of ϕ is adequate. Since adequate reasons
support only true formulas (by axiom scheme (A)), the NIL requirement guarantees that no false
“lemma” (i.e., formula) intrudes on a reason justifying a potential internal JTB of ϕ. This gives
rise to the following notion of JTB with no inadequate lemmas:
JTB+NIL(ϕ) := JTBi(ϕ) ∧ NIL(ϕ) .
This notion of JTB is logically stronger than external JTB: JTBe(ϕ) only requires that there be one
adequate reason supporting an internal JTB of ϕ, whereas JTB+NIL requires adequacy of every
reason supporting an internal JTB of ϕ. Thus ⊢ JTB+NIL(ϕ) → JTBe(ϕ) but not the other way
around.
These considerations raise a potential worry for the JTBe analysis of knowledge: what happens
when the agent rests her beliefs in a proposition (such as p∨q) on multiple sources? For example,11
suppose our agent, who has excellent eyesight, sees someone in the distance but cannot quite
make out who it is. Nevertheless, based on what she can see (represented by reason s), she
correctly believes that the person in the distance is either Tweedle Dee or Tweedle Dum (represented
respectively by p∨ q). Further, she has another reason r to believe that the person is Tweedle Dee
(i.e., p). For example, a friend might have told her that Tweedle Dum is on vacation in some
11The example was suggested to the first author by Timothy Williamson (private communication). See [9].
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faraway country. Now, unknown to our agent, the person in the distance is actually Tweedle Dum.
Put formally:
s : (p ∨ q) ∧ ¬(s : p) ∧ ¬(s : q) ∧ r : p ∧Bs ∧Br ∧ s ∧ (¬p ∧ q) . (TDTD)
That is, s supports the disjunction (that the person is Dee or Dum) but no disjunct, r supports the
claim it is Dee, the agent believes s and r to be adequate, s is adequate (by hypothesis, because
the agent’s eyesight is excellent, and it could not possibly be someone other than Dee or Dum),
and the person is actually not Dee but Dum. Now suppose we add to (TDTD) the assumption
(∀t)((t 6= s ∧ t 6= r)→ ¬Bt) (NoR)
that the agent believes no other reasons to be adequate. It can be shown that
⊢ [(TDTD) ∧ (NoR)]→ JTBe(p ∨ q) but
0 [(TDTD) ∧ (NoR)]→ JTB+NIL(p ∨ q) .
In words: the agent has external JTB that p ∨ q (because the adequate reason s supports the
disjunction); however, she does not have JTB with NIL of p ∨ q (because the inadequate reason
r supports the disjunction). But is it a mistake to equate knowledge with JTBe instead of with
JTB+NIL?
One reaction is to deny that there is knowledge when the universal condition is not satisfied.
For an example supporting this reaction, suppose the agent proves that a certain Mersenne number
m = 2n − 1 is prime. Later, she bolsters her belief in the primality of m by coming to believe
(incorrectly) that all Mersenne numbers are prime (i.e., all numbers of the form 2k − 1 are prime,
which is false). Can the agent still be said to know that m is prime? On one account, it seems
not. Such situations of mixed reasons, where an agent has both adequate and inadequate reasons
supporting the same proposition, arguably occur often in everyday life.
We are inclined to the opposite view: in a situation of mixed reasons, the agent can still have
knowledge. Returning to the primality example, if the agent learns that not all Mersenne numbers
are prime, then she will still believe that m is prime on the basis of her adequate “backup” reason
(that she proved m is prime). So she could still be said to know that m is prime.12 The Dee/Dum
case is arguably similar: if the agent were to learn that r is unreliable, then she would still have an
external JTB of the disjunction based on the “backup” reason s.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to the claim that (KJTBe) is correct even in the case
of mixed reasons comes when the quantity of inadequate reasons vastly exceeds the quantity of
adequate reasons. For example, suppose our agent has an adequate reason s (based on an assertion
in some recent official document) that one of the 20 members of the faculty of department D is a
logician; further, suppose she has inadequate reasons r1, . . . , r19 (based on a mistaken understanding
of which specialties imply competence in logic) that the first 19 names listed on the department D
faculty roster are logicians. We might be hard-pressed to say that our agent knows that department
D has a logician on staff.
Perhaps this suggests that the agent in a case of mixed reasons can only be said to know the
proposition if she also knows that her reasons are adequate. We resist this move, postponing further
discussion on this point until the conclusion. Therefore, if we assume for the sake of argument that
our agent values all reasons equally, then a tiny island of adequacy within an ocean of inadequacy is
12These ideas are related to the defeasibility theory of knowledge [13, 14].
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sufficient for the defender of mixed-reason knowledge. This might require granting that the agent’s
reasons are in some sense confused or that an agent who has only adequate reasons (and hence
satisfies JTB+NFL) seems to “know better” than the agent with mixed reasons. But if one agent
“knows better,” it does not follow that the other does not know at all. Intuitions here may differ,
so we prefer to leave a more detailed exploration of this problem for further work.
Let us return to the question raised at the beginning of this section: can we legitimately define
knowledge as JTBe? We have suggested an affirmative answer. But is JTBe too weak, especially
when compared to JTB+NIL? Our answer is that JTB+NIL does indeed correspond to a more
stringent concept of knowledge; perhaps we might call it “robust knowledge.” Such an ideal might
be more desirable to achieve, but this does not imply that the purely existential condition of
JTBe is itself insufficient. But does JTBe provide us with a noncircular analysis of knowledge (as
“JTB + x”)? We have no conclusive argument for a positive answer, though in a bolder mood we
might answer “maybe.” We did not provide an analysis of the notion of adequacy itself, so one
can still object that we have not ruled out the possibility of circularity. But we have also argued
that the notion of “adequate reason” does not necessarily involve an explicit reference to epistemic
concepts. Metaphysically, our notion of adequacy, which links reasons and propositions, may indeed
be independent of epistemic concepts. If anything, our analysis at least asserts the existence of an
essential connection between knowledge and justification, along with the existence of justifications
that are intrinsically better than others.
4 Conclusion
Is knowledge the same thing as JTB? We wrote this paper based on a persistent feeling that both
answers are defensible.13 For the negative: Gettier’s examples show that plausible reasons may be
inadequate. For the positive: a JTB based on an adequate reason seems to rule out the possibility
of Gettier cases and can arguably be construed as a form of knowledge.
We have shown that our framework is sufficient to address reason-based belief and that it can
be applied to important notions in epistemology. However, we have neglected to provide a further
analysis of “adequacy of a reason” into more primitive concepts. While this notion was used as
a primitive in this paper, an in-depth study of this notion may be required in a full philosophical
analysis of the concept of knowledge. Regardless, we think that our three-part hierarchy of reasons
(non-veridical, veridical but inadequate, and adequate) is itself sufficiently fruitful to legitimate our
approach.
A further and related difficulty on which we propose to end is the following: how does the agent
know whether a reason is adequate? According to (KJTBe), the agent knows p if and only if there
exists an adequate reason r that supports p and that the agent believes is adequate. Therefore, the
agent knows r is adequate if and only if there exists an adequate reason s that supports r (i.e., s : r)
and the agent believes that s is adequate.14 Our framework therefore admits the possibility that
the agent may know p based on an adequate reason r without knowing that r is itself adequate. In
13This ambivalence is not idiosyncratic to us. Turri [15] mentions that Sellars agrees with the force of Gettier’s
examples but still thinks that knowledge is JTB.
14Note that we may have s = r. In particular, it is consistent with our theory for reasons to be self-supporting
(i.e., r : r). It is also consistent with our theory for reasons to be non–self-supporting (i.e., ¬(r : r)). Since our theory
permits either option, it is up to the user of our theory to choose which way to go as per her preference. We also
note that it is consistent for r to be self-rejecting (i.e., r :¬r), and it is consistent for r to be non–self-rejecting (i.e.,
¬(r :¬r)).
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this, our framework supports the main contention of an externalist account of knowledge: one may
know p without knowing that one knows p (see [17]).15 We think this is right for the externalist,
though we emphasize that our theory is in principle neutral regarding the existence of reasons
justifying the adequacy of other reasons. We leave a more ample discussion of this issue for another
occasion.
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A Technical Results
A.1 Semantics for RBB
The models of RBB are structures M = (W, [·], N, V ) having:
• a nonempty set W of “possible worlds,”
• a function [·] : R→ ℘(W ×W ) mapping each reason r ∈ R to a binary relation [r] ⊆W ×W
on the set of possible worlds,
• a “neighborhood function” N : W → ℘(℘(W )) mapping each world w to a collection N(w)
of sets of worlds (“propositions”) that the agent believes at w,
• a propositional valuation V : W → ℘(P ) mapping each world w to the set V (w) of proposi-
tional letters that are true at w.
To indicate that the components W , [·], N , and V come from model M , we may write WM , [·]M ,
NM , and V M (respectively).
For each world w ∈W and reason r ∈ R, we let r(w) denote the set
r(w) := {v ∈W | (w, v) ∈ [r]}
of all worlds that are r-accessible from w (i.e., accessible according to the relation [r]). We also let
r◦ denote the set
r◦ := {v ∈W | (v, v) ∈ [r]}
of all worlds that are r-accessible from themselves. These are the worlds at which the reason r is
said to be reflexive. As we will see shortly, a reason that is reflexive at a world will be adequate
at that world. So reflexivity and adequacy are equivalent notions, and hence we may conflate the
two, which ought not cause confusion. To indicate the sets r(w) and r◦ arise from worlds in model
M , we may write rM (w) and rM◦ (respectively).
We require our models to satisfy three key properties:
15The internalist who objects to this need not dispair: though we do not do so here, it is possible to extend our
framework so that knowledge is internalizable; see [3] for details.
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(pr) For each x ∈ P ∩R, we have x ∈ V (w) if and only if w ∈ x(w).
This says that for propositional letters that are also reasons, the truth assignment given to x
by the valuation V agrees with the reflexivity of x. This ensures that there is no ambiguity
in the assignment of truth to propositional letters that are also reasons.16
(d) X ∈ N(w) implies W −X /∈ N(w).
This says that if the agent believes X at world w, then she does not believe the complement
W −X at world w.
(rb) r(w) ⊆ X and r◦ ∈ N(w) together imply that X ∈ N(w).
This says that if r is a reason to believe X at world w and the agent believes at w that r is
reflexive (i.e., an adequate reason), then the agent believes X at world w.
(d) and (rb) are the model-theoretic analogs of the axioms (D) and (RB), respectively. It can be
shown that properties (d) and (rb) together imply the following property:
(rc) r◦ ∈ N(w) and s◦ ∈ N(w) together imply that r(w) ∩ s(w) 6= ∅,
which says that if the agent believes reasons r and s are both reflexive, then these two reasons
are consistent.
In essence, since (d) requires belief consistency and (rb) says that the agent believes everything
supported by a reason she believes to be adequate, it follows that she will not believe contradic-
tory reasons to be adequate. (rc) is the model-theoretic analog of the principle (RC) of reason
consistency.
A pointed model is a pair (M,w) consisting of a model M and a world w in M . We write
M,w |= ϕ to say that ϕ is true at the pointed model (M,w), and we write M,w 6|= ϕ for the
negation. We define the satisfaction relation |= and the set
JχKM := {v ∈W |M,v |= χ}
of worlds in the model M at which the formula χ is satisfied as follows.
• M,w |= p means that p ∈ V (w).
• M,w |= ¬ϕ means that M,w 6|= ϕ.
• M,w |= ϕ ∨ ψ means that M,w |= ϕ or M,w |= ψ.
• M,w |= r :ϕ means that r(w) ⊆ JϕKM .
• M,w |= r means that w ∈ r(w).
• M,w |= Bϕ means that JϕKM ∈ N(w).
16By definition, the nonempty sets P and R are not necessarily disjoint. Therefore, our language allows for the
possibility that there are objects that are both propositional letters and reasons. The choice as to which possibility
to realize is up to the user, who may decide to take P ∩R = ∅ or not as per her preference.
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We note that |= is well-defined: for each x ∈ P ∩ R, we have x ∈ V (w) if and only w ∈ x(w) by
(pr), and therefore M,w |= x is well-defined. To say that ϕ is valid in M , written M |= ϕ, means
that JϕKM = W . To say that ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ, means that M |= ϕ for every model M . It
is shown in Theorem A.1 that RBB is sound and complete for this semantics: we have ⊢ ϕ if and
only if |= ϕ.
The following terminology is the semantic analog of terminology presented at the end of §2.1:
given a reason r and a pointed model (M,w) representing the key features of a particular situation
of reason-based belief, to say
• “r is adequate at (M,w)” means M,w |= r;
• “r is veridical for ϕ at (M,w)” means M,w |= r :ϕ→ ϕ; and
• “r is veridical at (M,w)” means M,w |= r :ϕ→ ϕ for each formula ϕ.
In using the above terminology, we may omit mention of (M,w) if it should be clear from context
which pointed model is meant. It follows by (rb) that every adequate reason is veridical; however,
for the same reasons as we have seen in the syntactic case, a veridical reason is not necessarily
adequate.
In the semantic context, an alternative notion of veridicality might be of interest: to say “r
is semantically veridical for X at (M,w),” where X ⊆ WM is a proposition (i.e., set of worlds),
means rM(w) ⊆ X implies w ∈ X; and to say “r is semantically veridical at (M,w)” means
r is semantically veridical for each X ⊆ WM . This notion of “semantic veridicality” is more
general than the notion of “syntactic veridicality” presented in the previous paragraph and at the
end of §2.1. Nevertheless, our primary interest is in syntactic veridicality, and so any mention of
“veridicality” should be assumed to refer to syntactic veridicality.
A.2 Semantics for RBBσ and RBB
+
σ
The models for RBB can be construed as models for RBBσ if we require the following additional
properties:
(ma) w ∈ σ(w) and r◦ ∈ N(w) together imply that w ∈ r(w).
which says that if σ is reflexive, then each reason r believed to be reflexive is in fact reflexive;
(mb) σ◦ ∈ N(w),
which says that the agent believes σ is reflexive; and
(mr) r(w) ⊆ X and r◦ ∈ N(w) together imply that σ(w) ⊆ X,
which says that σ supports X if r supports X and the agent believes r is reflexive.
We write the satisfaction relation |=σ to indicate that we restrict to models satisfying (ma), (mb),
and (mr). By Theorem A.2, RBBσ is sound and complete for the class of models satisfying (ma),
(mb), and (mr). Models for the theory RBB+σ must satisfy (ma), (mb), (mr), and the following
property:
(mt) X ∈ N(w) implies σ(w) ⊆ X,
which says that σ supports X if the agent believes X.
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We write |=+σ to indicate that we restrict to models satisfying (ma), (mb), (mr), and (mt). By
Theorem A.2, RBB+σ is sound and complete for the class of models satisfying (ma), (mb), (mr), and
(mt).
Generally, we shall work in the theory RBB and therefore none of principles (MA), (MB), (MR),
or (MT) (or their corresponding lowercase-named semantic principles) are to be assumed in what
follows, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
A.3 Semantics for QRBB, QRBBσ, and QRBB
+
σ
The models for RBB can be used as models for QRBB as well. All that we must do is add the
following satisfaction principles:
• M,w |= r = s means that r = s.
• M,w |= (∀r)ϕ means that M,w |= ϕ[s/r] for each s free for r in ϕ.
It is shown in Theorem A.5 that QRBB is sound and complete for this semantics: for each theory
we have QRBB ⊢ ϕ if and only if |= ϕ. However, there is one caveat: our proof of the completeness
result requires that the set R of reasons be at least countably infinite.
Additional semantic restrictions must be imposed to ensure that QRBB models also work for
QRBBσ or for QRBB
+
σ ; see §A.2 for details. Soundness and completeness for QRBBσ and for QRBB
+
σ
follows by Theorem A.12, with the same caveat for completeness as for QRBB.
A.4 RBB Soundness and Completeness
We now prove the following theorem.
Theorem A.1 (RBB Soundness and Completeness). For each ϕ ∈ F :
RBB ⊢ ϕ iff |= ϕ .
Soundness is by induction on the length of derivation. The arguments for (CL), (MP), (RK),
(D), (RN), and (E) are straighforward. We consider the remaining cases.
• Validity of (A): |= r :ϕ→ (r → ϕ).
M,w |= r :ϕ and M,w |= r together imply that r(w) ⊆ JϕKM and w ∈ r(w). But then
M,w |= ϕ.
• Validity of (RB): |= r :ϕ→ (Br → Bϕ).
M,w |= r :ϕ and M,w |= Br together imply that r(w) ⊆ JϕKM and r
◦ ∈ N(w). But then
JϕKM ∈ N(w) by (rb) and hence M,w |= Bϕ.
So RBB is sound.
For completeness, we prove that RBB 0 θ implies there exists a pointed model (Mc,Γ
θ
1) satisfying
Mc,Γ
θ
1 6|= θ. We use a canonical model construction to build the model Mc = (W, [·], N, V ) as
follows. First, to say that a set S of formulas is consistent means that for no finite S′ ⊆ S do we
have RBB ⊢ (
∧
S′)→ ⊥, where ⊥ is a fixed contradiction such as p ∧ ¬p. To say a set of formulas
is maximal consistent means that it is consistent and adding any formula not already present will
result in a set that is inconsistent (i.e., not consistent). LetM bet the set of all maximal consistent
21
sets of formulas. By a standard Lindenbaum construction, it follows that {¬θ} can be extended to
some Γθ ∈M and therefore M is not empty. We define W :=M ×{1, 2} and will write (Γ, i) ∈W
in the abbreviated form Γi. Since M is nonempty, W is nonempty. For each reason r ∈ R and
Γ ∈M , define the set
Γr := {ϕ ∈ F | r :ϕ ∈ Γ}
of r-supported formulas in Γ. We then define [r] by setting
r(Γi) := {∆j ∈W | Γ
r ⊆ ∆ & (¬r ∈ Γ⇒ ∆j 6= Γi)} .
This way, a world ∆j is r-accessible from Γi iff ∆j contains all formulas ϕ that are r-supported
at Γi (as per membership of r :ϕ in Γ), unless of course ∆j = Γi and reflexivity is forbidden by
¬r ∈ Γ. For each formula ϕ ∈ F , define
W (ϕ) := {Γi ∈W | ϕ ∈ Γ}
to be the set of worlds defined by the formula ϕ. Then let
N+ := {X ⊆W | ∀ϕ ∈ F : X 6=W (ϕ)}
be the set of worlds not definable by any formula. For each Γi ∈W , we define
N+(Γi) := {X ∈ N
+ | ∃Br ∈ Γ : r(Γi) ⊆ X} .
Intuitively, this is the set of non–formula-definable neighborhoods X for which the agent believes
there is a reason that supports X. The neighborhood function N is then defined by
N(Γi) := {X ⊆W | ∃Bϕ ∈ Γ : X =W (ϕ)} ∪N
+(Γi) .
Therefore, an agent believes a neighborhood X iff the agent believes some formula ϕ that defines
X or, if X is non–formula-definable, the agent believes there is a reason supporting X. Finally, we
define the valuation by
V (Γi) := {p ∈ P | p ∈ Γ} .
This defines Mc.
We prove the following Consistency Lemma: for each r ∈ R and Γi ∈W , if Br ∈ Γ, then Γ
r is
consistent. Proceeding, assume Br ∈ Γ and hence that ¬B¬r ∈ Γ by (D) and maximal consistency.
Toward a contradiction, suppose Γr is not consistent. Then there exists a finite S ⊆ Γr such that
⊢ (
∧
S)→ ⊥. Hence ⊢ (
∧
χ∈S r :χ)→ r :⊥ by modal reasoning. Applying maximal consistency and
the fact that S ⊆ Γr, we obtain r :⊥ ∈ Γ. By maximal consistency and the fact that ⊢ r :⊥ → r :ϕ
for any ϕ, we obtain r :¬r ∈ Γ. Since Br ∈ Γ, it follows from r :¬r ∈ Γ by (RB) and maximal
consistency that B¬r ∈ Γ. Since ¬B¬r ∈ Γ, it follows that Γ is not consistent, a contradiction.
Conclusion: Γr is consistent.
We now prove that Mc satisfies the properties (pr), (d), and (rb).
• Mc satisfies (pr): if x ∈ P ∩R, then x ∈ V (Γi) if and only if Γi ∈ x(Γi).
So assume x ∈ V (Γi). This means x ∈ Γ. But then we have ¬x /∈ Γ by the consistency of
Γ. Further, since x ∈ Γ, it follows by (A) and the maximal consistency of Γ that Γx ⊆ Γ.
But ¬x /∈ Γ and Γx ⊆ Γ together imply Γi ∈ x(Γi), which completes the argument for this
direction. For the converse direction, if Γi ∈ x(Γi), then it follows by the definition of x(Γi)
that ¬x /∈ Γ. So x ∈ Γ by the maximal consistency of Γ. But then we have x ∈ V (Γi) by the
definition of V .
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• Mc satisfies (d): if X ∈ N(Γi), then X
′ :=W −X /∈ N(Γi). There are two cases to consider.
First case for (d): assume X ∈ N(Γi) − N
+(Γi). It follows that there exists Bϕ ∈ Γ such
that X = W (ϕ). By (D) and the maximal consistency of Γ, we have ¬B¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Toward
a contradiction, assume X ′ ∈ N(Γi). Since X = W (ϕ), we have X
′ = W (¬ϕ) by maximal
consistency and therefore that X ′ /∈ N+. Hence X ′ ∈ N(Γi) − N
+(Γi), which means there
exists Bψ ∈ Γ such that X ′ =W (ψ). It follows that ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬ϕ, since otherwise {ψ,ϕ} could
be extended to some ∆ ∈ M satisfying ∆j ∈ W (ψ) = X
′ and ∆j ∈ W (ϕ) = X or {¬ψ,¬ϕ}
could be extended to some Ω ∈M satisfying Ωk ∈W−W (ψ) = X and Ωk ∈W−W (ϕ) = X
′,
but both situations are impossible because X ′ ∩ X = ∅. Hence ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬ϕ. Applying (E),
we obtain ⊢ Bψ ↔ B¬ϕ and therefore that B¬ϕ ∈ Γ, contradicting the consistency of Γ.
Conclusion: X ′ /∈ N(Γi).
Second case for (d): assume X ∈ N+(Γi). This means there exists Br ∈ Γ such that r(Γi) ⊆
X. Since X ∈ N+, it follows that X ′ ∈ N+ as well. So, toward a contradiction, assume
X ′ ∈ N+(Γi). Then we have Br
′ ∈ Γ such that r′(Γi) ⊆ X
′, and hence r′(Γi) ∩ r(Γi) = ∅.
If Γr ∪ Γr
′
were consistent, then we could extend this set to some ∆ ∈ M . Taking j 6= i,
it would follow that Γr ⊆ ∆ and Γr
′
⊆ ∆ and that ∆j 6= Γi. Hence we would have that
∆j ∈ r
′(Γi) ∩ r(Γi) = ∅, an impossibility. So Γ
r ∪ Γr
′
is not consistent. Applying the
Consistency Lemma and the fact that Br ∈ Γ and Br′ ∈ Γ, each of Γr and Γr
′
is consistent,
so it follows from the inconsistency of Γr ∪ Γr
′
that there exists a finite S ⊆ Γr and some
ϕ ∈ Γr
′
such that ⊢ (
∧
S) → ¬ϕ. But then we have ⊢ (
∧
χ∈S r :χ) → r :¬ϕ by modal
reasoning. Since S ⊆ Γr, it follows by maximal consistency that r :¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Applying our
assumption Br ∈ Γ, it follows by (RB) and maximal consistency that B¬ϕ ∈ Γ. But ϕ ∈ Γr
′
and hence r′ :ϕ ∈ Γ. Since Br′ ∈ Γ, it follows by (RB) and maximal consistency that Bϕ ∈ Γ
and therefore that ¬B¬ϕ ∈ Γ by (D) and maximal consistency. But then we have shown that
Γ is inconsistent, a contradiction. Conclusion: X ′ /∈ N+(Γi).
• Mc satisfies (rb): if r(Γi) ⊆ X and r
◦ ∈ N(Γi), then X ∈ N(Γi).
Assume r(Γi) ⊆ X and r
◦ ∈ N(Γi). First, it follows by an easy argument that r
◦ = W (r).
Therefore r◦ /∈ N+. So from r◦ ∈ N(Γi), it follows that there exists Bϕ ∈ Γ such that
r◦ = W (ϕ). Since r◦ = W (r), it follows that ⊢ ϕ ↔ r. Applying (E), ⊢ Bϕ ↔ Br. By
the maximal consistency of Γ, we have Br ∈ Γ. If X ∈ N+, then since we have shown
that Br ∈ Γ and since we assumed that r(Γi) ⊆ X, it follows that X ∈ N
+(Γi) ⊆ N(Γi). So
assume X /∈ N+, which implies there exists ψ such that X =W (ψ). From r(Γi) ⊆ X =W (ψ)
and j 6= i, it follows that for each ∆j ∈ W satisfying Γ
r ⊆ ∆, we have ψ ∈ ∆. If Γr ∪ {¬ψ}
were consistent, then we could extend this set to Ω ∈ M such that Γr ⊆ Ω, j 6= i, Ωj ∈ W ,
and ψ /∈ Ω, a contradiction. So from the inconsistency of Γr ∪ {¬ψ}, the fact that Br ∈ Γ,
and the consistency of Γr (by way of the Consistency Lemma), it follows that there exists a
finite S ⊆ Γr such that ⊢ (
∧
S) → ψ and hence ⊢ (
∧
χ∈S r :χ) → r :ψ by modal reasoning.
Since S ⊆ Γr, it follows by maximal consistency that r :ψ ∈ Γ. But since Br ∈ Γ, it follows
by (RB) and maximal consistency that Bψ ∈ Γ and hence W (ψ) = X ∈ N(Γi).
To complete the argument, it suffices to prove the Truth Lemma: for each formula ϕ ∈ F and world
Γi ∈ W , we have ϕ ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= ϕ. The proof is by induction on the construction of formulas,
and the arguments for the base and Boolean inductive step cases are standard, so we only consider
the remaining non-Boolean inductive step cases.
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• Inductive step: r ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= r.
If r ∈ Γ, then it follows by (A) and maximal consistency that Γr ⊆ Γ and therefore that
Γi ∈ r(Γi). But this is what it means to have Mc,Γi |= r.
Conversely, if Mc,Γi |= r, then we have Γi ∈ r(Γi). By the definition of N(Γi), we have
¬r /∈ Γ and therefore r ∈ Γ by maximal consistency.
• Inductive step: r :ϕ ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= r :ϕ.
If r :ϕ ∈ Γ, then we have r(Γi) ⊆ W (ϕ). By the induction hypothesis, r(Γi) ⊆ JϕKMc . But
this is what it means to have Mc, w |= r :ϕ.
Conversely, if Mc, w |= r :ϕ, then we have r(Γi) ⊆ JϕKMc and hence r(Γi) ⊆ W (ϕ) by the
induction hypothesis. Toward a contradiction, assume ¬r :ϕ ∈ Γ. It follows that Γr ∪ {¬ϕ}
is consistent, for otherwise there would exist a finite S ⊆ Γr such that ⊢ (
∧
S) → ϕ, hence
⊢ (
∧
χ∈S r :χ)→ r :ϕ by modal reasoning, and therefore r :ϕ ∈ Γ, which is impossible because
it would follow by the assumption ¬r :ϕ ∈ Γ that Γ is inconsistent. So we may extend the
consistent set Γr ∪ {¬ϕ} to some ∆ ∈ M . Taking j 6= i, it follows that ∆j /∈ W (ϕ) and
∆j ∈ r(Γi), which contradicts r(Γi) ⊆W (ϕ). So our assumption that ¬r :ϕ ∈ Γ is incorrect;
what we actually have is that ¬r :ϕ /∈ Γ and therefore that r :ϕ ∈ Γ by maximal consistency.
• Inductive step: Bϕ ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= Bϕ.
If Bϕ ∈ Γ, then it follows by the definition of N(Γi) that W (ϕ) ∈ N(Γi). By the induction
hypothesis, W (ϕ) = JϕKMc, and hence JϕKMc ∈ N(Γi). But this is what it means to have
Mc,Γi |= Bϕ.
Conversely, if Mc, w |= Bϕ, then we have JϕKMc ∈ N(Γi) and therefore that W (ϕ) ∈ N(Γi)
by the induction hypothesis. Since W (ϕ) /∈ N+, it follows that there exists Bψ ∈ Γ such that
W (ψ) = W (ϕ). From this we have that ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ, for otherwise {ψ,¬ϕ} could be extended
to ∆ ∈ M satisfying ∆i ∈ W (ψ)−W (ϕ) or {¬ψ,ϕ} could be extended to Ω ∈ M satisfying
Ωi ∈W (ϕ)−W (ψ), but both contradict W (ϕ) =W (ψ). Applying (E), we have ⊢ Bϕ↔ Bϕ
and therefore it follows by maximal consistency that Bϕ ∈ Γ.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. By this lemma and the fact that ¬θ ∈ Γθ, we have
Mc,Γ
θ
1 6|= θ. Completeness follows.
A.5 RBBσ and RBB
+
σ Soundness and Completeness
Recalling the semantics for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ from §A.2, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem A.2 (RBBσ and RBB
+
σ Soundness and Completeness). Assume R contains the symbol
σ. For each ϕ ∈ F :
RBBσ ⊢ ϕ iff |=σ ϕ and
RBB+σ ⊢ ϕ iff |=
+
σ ϕ .
Soundness for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ are as for RBB (Theorem A.1) except that we must check
soundness of the additional axioms. We consider each in turn.
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• Validity of (MA): |=σ σ → (Br→ r) and |=
+
σ σ → (Br → r).
Assume M,w |=σ σ and M,w |=σ Br. This means w ∈ σ(w) and r
◦ ∈ N(w), from which
it follows by (ma) that w ∈ r(w). But then M,w |=σ r. The argument for the satisfaction
operator |=+σ is the same.
• Validity of (MB): |=σ Bσ and |=
+
σ Bσ.
Given (M,w), we have σ◦ ∈ N(w) by (mb). So M,w |=σ Bσ and M,w |=
+
σ Bσ.
• Validity of (MR): |=σ r :ϕ→ (Br→ σ :ϕ) and |=
+
σ r :ϕ→ (Br → σ :ϕ).
Assume M,w |=σ r :ϕ and M,w |=σ Br. Then r(w) ⊆ JϕKM and r
◦ ∈ N(w). Applying (mr),
it follows that σ(w) ⊆ JϕKM . But then M,w |=σ σ :ϕ. The argument for the satisfaction
operator |=+σ is the same.
• Validity of (MT): |=+σ Bϕ→ σ :ϕ.
Assume M,w |=+σ Bϕ. This means JϕKM ∈ N(w). Applying (mt), we have σ(w) ⊆ JϕKM .
But this is what it means to have M,w |=+σ σ :ϕ.
So RBBσ and RBB
+
σ are sound. Completeness for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ is as for RBB (Theorem A.1)
except that provability is taken with respect to the theory in question and we must show that Mc
satisfies the additional properties required of models of this theory (§A.2).
• Mc satisfies (ma) for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ : Γi ∈ σ(Γi) and r
◦ ∈ N(Γi) together imply that
Γi ∈ r(Γi).
Assume Γi ∈ σ(Γi) and r
◦ ∈ N(w). As in the proof that Mc satisfies (rb) from Theorem A.1,
it follows from r◦ ∈ N(Γi) that Br ∈ Γ. Applying the definition of σ(Γi) to our assumption
Γi ∈ σ(Γi), it follows that ¬σ /∈ Γ and therefore σ ∈ Γ by maximal consistency. Since σ ∈ Γ
and Br ∈ Γ, we have by (MA) and maximal consistency that r ∈ Γ. But then Γr ⊆ Γ by (A)
and maximal consistency. Since it follows from r ∈ Γ by maximal consistency that ¬r /∈ Γ
and we have shown that Γr ⊆ Γ, it follows by the definition of r(Γi) that Γi ∈ r(Γi).
• Mc satisfies (mb) for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ : σ
◦ ∈ N(Γi).
We have Bσ ∈ Γ by (MB). Hence σ◦ =W (σ) ∈ N(Γi).
• Mc satisfies (mr) for RBBσ and for RBB
+
σ : r(Γi) ⊆ X and r
◦ ∈ N(Γi) together imply that
σ(Γi) ⊆ X.
Assume r(Γi) ⊆ X and r
◦ ∈ N(Γi). As in the proof that Mc satisfies (rb) from Theorem A.1,
it follows from r◦ ∈ N(Γi) that Br ∈ Γ. Applying (MR), classical reasoning, and maximal
consistency, we have r :ϕ→ σ :ϕ for each formula ϕ in the language. So if for some ∆ ∈ M
we have Γσ ⊆ ∆ and ϕ ∈ Γr, then r :ϕ ∈ Γ by the definition of Γr, hence σ :ϕ ∈ Γ by
maximal consistency and the fact that r :ϕ → σ :ϕ ∈ Γ, hence ϕ ∈ Γσ by the defintion
of Γσ, and therefore ϕ ∈ ∆ by the assumption Γσ ⊆ ∆. That is, given ∆ ∈ M , we have
Γσ ⊆ ∆ implies Γr ⊆ ∆. So if we are given ∆j ∈ σ(Γi), then we have Γ
σ ⊆ ∆ and therefore
that Γr ⊆ ∆. Now if ∆j 6= Γi, then we have ∆j ∈ r(Γi) by the definition of r(Γi). And if
∆j = Γi and therefore ¬σ /∈ Γ by the definition of σ(Γi), it follows by maximal consistency
that σ ∈ Γ; hence r ∈ Γ by Br ∈ Γ, (MA), and maximal consistency; hence ¬r /∈ Γ by
maximal consistency; and therefore we still have ∆j ∈ r(Γi) by the definition of r(Γi). So we
have shown that σ(Γi) ⊆ r(Γi). Since r(Γi) ⊆ X, it follows that σ(Γi) ⊆ X.
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• Mc satisfies (mt) for RBB
+
σ : X ∈ N(Γi) implies σ(Γi) ⊆ X.
Assume X ∈ N(Γi). There are two cases to consider. First case: if X ∈ N
+(Γi), then there
exists Br ∈ Γ such that r(Γi) ⊆ X. But we proved in the above argument for (mr) that Br ∈ Γ
and r(Γi) ⊆ X together imply that σ(Γi) ⊆ r(Γi) ⊆ X. Second case: X ∈ N(Γi) −N
+(Γi).
Then there exists Bϕ ∈ Γ such thatW (ϕ) = X. By (MT) and maximal consistency, σ :ϕ ∈ Γ.
Hence σ(Γi) ⊆W (ϕ) = X.
A.6 Lemmas for QRBB Completeness
The results of this section will be used in §A.7 to prove completeness for QRBB. All provability in
this section is taken with respect to QRBB.
Lemma A.3. QRBB satisfies the following:
• Distributivity : ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ ((∀r)ϕ→ (∀r)ψ);
• the Distribution Rule: ⊢ ϕ→ ψ implies ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ (∀r)ψ;
• the Renaming Rule: if s has no occurrence in ϕ, then
⊢ (∀r)ϕ↔ (∀s)ϕ[s/r] and ⊢ (∃r)ϕ↔ (∃s)ϕ[s/r] ;
• the Equivalence Rule: ⊢ ϕ↔ ϕ′ implies
⊢ (∀r)ϕ↔ (∀r)ϕ′ and ⊢ (∃r)ϕ↔ (∃r)ϕ′ .
Proof. For Distributivity:
1. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ) (UI)
2. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ ϕ (UI)
3. ⊢ ((∀r)(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (∀r)ϕ)→ ψ by 1, 2
4. ⊢ (∀r)[((∀r)(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (∀r)ϕ)→ ψ] by 3, (Gen)
5. ⊢ ((∀r)(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (∀r)ϕ)→ (∀r)ψ by 4, (UD), (MP)
6. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ ((∀r)ϕ→ (∀r)ψ) by 5
For the Distribution Rule:
1. ⊢ ϕ→ ψ assumption
2. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ ϕ (UI)
3. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ ψ by 1, 2
4. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ (∀r)ψ by 3, (UD), (MP).
For the Renaming Rule: if s has no occurrence in ϕ, then
1. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ ϕ[s/r] (UI)
2. ⊢ (∀s)((∀r)ϕ→ ϕ[s/r]) by 1, (Gen)
3. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ (∀s)ϕ[s/r] by 2, (UD), (MP)
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For the Equivalence Rule:
1. ⊢ ϕ↔ ϕ′ assumption
2. ⊢ ϕ→ ϕ′ by 1
3. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ→ (∀r)ϕ′ by 2, Distribution Rule
4. ⊢ ϕ′ → ϕ by 1
5. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ′ → (∀r)ϕ by 4, Distribution Rule
6. ⊢ (∀r)ϕ↔ (∀r)ϕ′ by 3, 5 — our first result
7. ⊢ ¬ϕ↔ ¬ϕ′ by 1
8. ⊢ (∀r)¬ϕ↔ (∀r)¬ϕ′ from 7 by an argument like 1–6
9. ⊢ ¬(∀r)¬ϕ↔ ¬(∀r)¬ϕ′ by 8
10. ⊢ (∃r)ϕ↔ (∃r)ϕ′ by 9
Lemma A.4. If r is not free in ψ, then:
1. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ ((∃r)ϕ→ ψ); and
2. ⊢ (∃r)(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ → (∃r)ϕ).
Proof. For Item 1: if r is not free in ψ, then
1. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀r)(¬ψ → ¬ϕ) Equivalence Rule
2. ⊢ (∀r)(¬ψ → ¬ϕ)→ (¬ψ → (∀r)¬ϕ) (UI)
3. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → (∀r)¬ϕ) by 1, 2
4. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (¬(∀r)¬ϕ→ ψ) from 3
5. ⊢ (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ ((∃r)ϕ→ ψ) from 4
For Item 2: if r is not free in ψ, then
1. ⊢ ψ → (¬ϕ→ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)) (CL)
2. ⊢ (∀r)ψ → (∀r)(¬ϕ→ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)) by 1, Distribution Rule
3. ⊢ (∀r)ψ → ((∀r)¬ϕ→ (∀r)(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)) by 2, Distributivity
4. ⊢ ((∀r)ψ ∧ (∀r)¬ϕ)→ (∀r)(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) by 3
5. ⊢ ψ → ψ (CL)
6. ⊢ ψ → (∀r)ψ by 5, (UI), (MP)
7. ⊢ (ψ ∧ (∀r)¬ϕ)→ (∀r)(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) by 4, 6
8. ⊢ ¬(∀r)(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ (ψ → ¬(∀r)¬ϕ) by 7
9. ⊢ ¬(∀r)¬(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ → ¬(∀r)¬ϕ) by 8, Equivalence Rule
10. ⊢ (∃r)(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ → (∃r)ϕ) by 9
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A.7 QRBB Soundness and Completeness
Recalling the semantics for QRBB from §A.3, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem A.5 (QRBB Soundness and Completeness). We have:
• QRBB is sound: QRBB ⊢ ϕ implies |= ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F ∀; and
• if R is at least countably infinite, then QRBB is sound and complete: for each ϕ ∈ F ∀,
QRBB ⊢ ϕ iff |= ϕ .
Soundness is by induction on the length of derivation. Most cases are addressed in the proof of
Theorem A.1. We only address the remaining cases.
• Validity of (UD): |= (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ (∀r)ψ), where r is not free in ϕ.
AssumeM,w |= (∀r)(ϕ→ ψ) andM,w |= ϕ. From the former, we haveM,w |= (ϕ→ ψ)[s/r]
for each s free for r in ϕ→ ψ. Since r is not free in ϕ, it follows that M,w |= ϕ→ ψ[s/r] for
each s free for r in ψ. By our assumption M,w |= ϕ, it follows that M,w |= ψ[s/r] for each
s free for r in ψ. That is, M,w |= (∀r)ψ.
• Validity of (UI): |= (∀r)ϕ→ ϕ[s/r], where s is free for r in ϕ.
By the definition of satisfaction.
• Validity of (EP) and (EN): |= r = r and |= ¬(r = s), where r and s are different.
By the definition of satisfaction.
• (Gen) preserves validity: |= ϕ implies |= (∀r)ϕ.
If 6|= (∀r)ϕ, then there exists (M,w) and s free for r in ϕ such that M,w 6|= ϕ[s/r]. Given
that M = (W, [·], N, V ), define the model M ′ = (W, [·]′, N, V ) by setting
[t]′ :=
{
[s] if t = r,
[t] otherwise.
It follows that rM
′
(w) = sM (w) and tM
′
(w) = tM (w) for all t 6= r. By the usual arguments
about the preservation of truth of formulas under the renaming of quantified variables and
their corresponding bound occurrences, we may assume without loss of generality that every
occurrence of r in ϕ is free. But then it is easy to see that we haveM,w 6|= ϕ[s/r] iffM ′, w 6|= ϕ.
After all, ϕ and ϕ[s/r] differ only in the occurrences of r in ϕ that are replaced by s in ϕ[s/r],
andM ′ interprets all such occurrences of r just asM interprets the corresponding occurrences
of s. And all other occurrences of symbols in ϕ are the same as they are in ϕ[s/r], they are
syntactically different than r, and M ′ and M interpret them in the same way. Conclusion:
6|= ϕ.
So QRBB is sound.
For completeness, we adapt the standard Henkin-style construction in [16, §3.1] to the present
setting. To begin, our language F ∀ depends on two parameters: a nonempty set R of reasons and a
nonempty set P of propositional letters. We shall keep P fixed but consider different options for R.
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As such, it will be convenient to write L(R) to denote the set of formulas with quantifiers that we
can form using R 6= ∅ as our set of reasons. By convention in this proof, we restrict all derivation
to be with respect to QRBB. Also, we shall assume for the remainder of the argument that R is at
least countably infinite.
To say that a set Γ ⊆ L(R) is consistent means that for no finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ is it the case that
⊢ (
∧
Γ′) → ⊥. To say that Γ ⊆ L(R) is maximal L(R)-consistent means that Γ is consistent and
adding to Γ any formula of L(R) not already present would produce an inconsistent set.
For the purposes of the present proof, a theory in the language L(R) is a set T ⊆ L(R) of
formulas in L(R) satisfying the following properties:
• Closure under theorems: if ϕ ∈ L(R) and ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ T ; and
• Closure under (MP): if ϕ→ ψ ∈ T and ϕ ∈ T , then ψ ∈ T .
Given Γ ⊆ L(R), let TR(Γ) be the set of all theories in L(R) that contain Γ. The intersection of
a collection of theories in L(R) is also a theory in L(R). Hence for each Γ ⊆ L(R), we may define
the theory
TR(Γ) :=
⋂
TR(Γ)
called the theory in L(R) generated by Γ.
An L(R)-proof from Γ is a finite nonempty sequence 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 of formulas in L(R) such that
for each ϕi in the sequence, we have one of the following: ϕi ∈ Γ, QRBB ⊢ ϕi, or there exist ϕj and
ϕk from earlier in the sequence (i.e., j < i and k < i) such that ϕi follows by (MP) from ϕj and ϕk
(i.e., ϕk = ϕj → ϕi). To say that an L(R)-proof from Γ is of ϕ, means that ϕ is the last formula in
the sequence. We write Γ ⊢R ϕ to mean that there exists an L(R)-proof of ϕ from Γ. Notation: in
writing the set to the left of the turnstile ⊢R, we may use a comma to denote set-theoretic union, we
may identify an individual formula with the singleton set containing the formula in question, and
we may omit any set-indicating notation if the set is empty. We state without proof the following
results, grouped together under the name Simple Lemma:
• Γ ⊢R ϕ iff ϕ ∈ TR(Γ);
• Γ ⊢R ϕ iff TR(Γ) ⊢R ϕ;
• Γ ⊢R ϕ iff there exists a Γ
′ ⊆ Γ such that Γ′ ⊢R ϕ;
• Γ ⊢R ϕ iff there exists a finite Γ
′ ⊆ Γ such that Γ′ ⊢R ϕ;
• if Γ is finite, then Γ′ ⊢R ϕ iff
∧
Γ′ ⊢R ϕ, where
∧
Γ′ :=
∧
χ∈Γ′ χ; and
• ⊢R ϕ iff QRBB ⊢ ϕ.
Generally the Simple Lemma will be used only tacitly.
Given a theory T in L(R) and a theory T ′ in L(R′), to say that T ′ is an extension of T means
that T ⊆ T ′. To say that T ′ is a conservative extension of T means that T ′ ∩ L(R) = T .
To say that a theory T in L(R) is Henkin means that for each closed formula (i.e., containing
no free variables) of the form ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R), there exists a reason rϕ ∈ R called a witness (or
Henkin constant) for ¬(∀r)ϕ for which we have
(¬(∀r)ϕ→ ¬ϕ[rϕ/r]) ∈ T .
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Given a theory T in L(R), let R∗ be the set obtained from R by adding for each closed ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈
L(R) a new reason rϕ. To be clear: there is a bijection between the set of closed formulas ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈
L(R) and the set R∗ −R. We define the set
H(R) := {¬(∀r)ϕ→ ¬ϕ[rϕ/r] | ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R) is closed }
of Henkin axioms in L(R) and let T ∗ := TR∗(T ∪ H(R)) be the theory in L(R
∗) generated by
T ∪H(R).
Lemma A.6 (Constants). Assume R is at least countably infinite and R ⊆ R′. If Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L(R),
then Γ ⊢R′ ϕ iff Γ ⊢R ϕ.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is immediate (since R ⊆ R′), so we prove only the left-to-right
direction. Proceeding, assume Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(R) and Γ ⊢R′ ϕ; that is, there exists an L(R
′)-proof
π′ = 〈ψ′1, . . . , ψ
′
n〉 of ϕ from Γ. Let r
′
1, . . . , r
′
m be a non-repeating list of all reasons in R
′ −R that
appear in π′. Since R is at least countably infinite and π′ is finite, we may choose a non-repeating
list r1, . . . , rm of reasons in R that do not appear anywhere in π
′. Such a list exists because R is at
least countably infinite. Form π := 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉 by defining ψi as the formula obtained from ψ
′
i by
replacing all occurrences of r′1, . . . , r
′
m by r1, . . . , rm (respectively). Since Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L(R), one may
verify that π is an L(R)-proof of ϕ from Γ (i.e., formulas in Γ ⊆ L(R) are left unchanged, QRBB-
theorems in L(R′) are mapped to QRBB-theorems in L(R), formulas in L(R′) obtained via (MP)
in π′ are mapped to formulas in L(R) obtained via (MP) in π, and ϕ ∈ L(R) is left unchanged).
Hence Γ ⊢R ϕ.
Lemma A.7 (Deduction). For each R, we have:
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢R ψ iff Γ ⊢R ϕ→ ψ .
Proof. The right-to-left direction is easy, so we only address the left-to-right direction. Proceeding,
assume Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢R ψ, which implies there exists an L(R)-proof 〈χ1, . . . , χn〉 of ψ from Γ ∪ {ϕ}. It
suffices for us to prove by induction on i ≤ n that Γ ⊢R ϕ→ χi.
In the base case, i = 1 and therefore either ⊢ χi or χi ∈ Γ ∪ {ϕ}. If ⊢ χi, then Γ ⊢R χi. If
χi ∈ Γ ∪ {ϕ}, then either χi ∈ Γ or χi = ϕ. If χi = ϕ, then since ⊢ ϕ → ϕ by (CL), we have
Γ ⊢R ϕ → ϕ. So suppose χi ∈ Γ. Hence Γ ⊢R χi. Since for ǫi := χi → (ϕ → χi) we have ⊢ ǫi by
(CL), we have Γ ⊢R ǫi and therefore Γ ⊢R ϕ→ χi.
For the induction step (i > 1), we have that ⊢ χi, that χi ∈ Γ ∪ {ϕ}, or that χi follows by
(MP) from χk and χk → χi appearing earlier in the L(R)-proof. The argument for the first two
possibilities is as in the base case. So assume the third possibility obtains. By the induction
hypothesis, we have Γ ⊢R ϕ→ χk and Γ ⊢R ϕ→ (χk → χi) Let θi be the classical tautology
θi := (ϕ→ (χk → χi))→ ((ϕ→ χk)→ (ϕ→ χi)) .
We have ⊢ θi by (CL) and hence Γ ⊢R θi. But then Γ ⊢R ϕ→ χi by (MP).
We remark that the version of Lemma A.7 for the QRBB consequence relation ⊢ does not hold
in general. For example, we have r :ϕ ⊢ (∀r)(r :ϕ) and yet 0 r :ϕ → (∀r)(r :ϕ). As another
example, we have p ⊢ r : p and yet 0 p → r : p. Lemma A.7 does not fail in similar ways because
the consequence relation given by the R-specific turnstile ⊢R gives rise to a notion of proof (i.e.,
the L(R)-proof) that forbids the direct use of any QRBB rule other than (MP).
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Lemma A.8 (Fresh Variable). If s ∈ R does not occur in any formula in Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(R), then,
letting Γ[s/r] := {χ[s/r] | χ ∈ Γ}, we have:
1. ⊢ ϕ iff ⊢ ϕ[s/r], and
2. Γ ⊢R ϕ iff Γ[s/r] ⊢R ϕ[s/r].
Proof. 1 follows by induction on the length of QRBB derivations. 2 follows by induction on the
length of L(R)-proofs and makes use of 1.
Lemma A.9 (Conservativity). Assume R is at least countably infinite. If T is a theory in L(R),
then T ∗ is a conservative extension of T .
Proof. We prove that for each ϕ ∈ L(R), we have T ∗ ⊢R∗ ϕ iff T ⊢R ϕ. The right-to-left direction
is immediate, so we only need prove the left-to-right direction. Proceeding, if ϕ ∈ L(R), then we
have T ∗ ⊢R∗ ϕ iff there exists a finite set H ⊆ H(R) of Henkin axioms satisfying T,H ⊢R∗ ϕ. So
it suffices for us to prove by induction on the finite cardinality of H ⊆ H(R) that T,H ⊢R∗ ϕ
implies T ⊢R ϕ. The base case (where H = ∅) follows by Lemma A.6, so we proceed directly to
the induction step. That is, we assume that the result holds for H ⊆ H(R) having |H| = n and we
prove the result holds for H ⊆ H(R) having |H| = n + 1. Proceeding, take H ⊆ H(R) satisfying
|H| = n+ 1, choose a Henkin axiom h ∈ H with
h = ¬(∀r)ψ → ¬ψ[rψ/r] ,
and define H ′ := H − {h} so that H = H ′ ∪ {h} and |H ′| = n. Now assume T,H ⊢R∗ ϕ with
ϕ ∈ L(R), and hence T,H ′, h ⊢R∗ ϕ. It follows that there is a finite T
′ ⊆ T such that T ′,H ′, h ⊢R∗ ϕ.
Let s ∈ R be a variable not occuring in any formula in the finite set T ′ ∪H ′ ∪ {h, ϕ}. Such s exists
because R is at least countably infinite. Define
h′ := ¬(∀r)ψ → ¬ψ[s/r] .
Then, omitting mention of instances of classical reasoning, we have:
T ′,H ′, h ⊢R∗ ϕ (derived above)
T ′,H ′, h′ ⊢R∗ ϕ Lemma A.8
⊢R∗
∧
(T ′ ∪H ′)→ (h′ → ϕ) Lemma A.7
⊢
∧
(T ′ ∪H ′)→ (h′ → ϕ) Simple Lemma
⊢ (∀s)(
∧
(T ′ ∪H ′)→ (h′ → ϕ)) (Gen)
⊢
∧
(T ′ ∪H ′)→ (∀s)(h′ → ϕ) (UD), no s in T ′ ∪H ′
⊢R∗
∧
(T ′ ∪H ′)→ (∀s)(h′ → ϕ) Simple Lemma
T ′,H ′ ⊢R∗ (∀s)(h
′ → ϕ) Lemma A.7
T ′,H ′ ⊢R∗ (∀s)((¬(∀r)ψ → ¬ψ[s/r])→ ϕ) write out h
′
T ′,H ′ ⊢R∗ (¬(∀r)ψ → (∃s)¬ψ[s/r])→ ϕ Lemma A.4, s not in ϕ
T ′,H ′ ⊢R∗ (¬(∀r)ψ → ¬(∀s)¬¬ψ[s/r])→ ϕ definition of ∃
T ′,H ′ ⊢R∗ (¬(∀r)ψ → ¬(∀s)ψ[s/r])→ ϕ Equivalence (Lemma A.3)
T ′,H ′ ⊢R∗ ϕ Renaming (Lemma A.3)
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Therefore T,H ′ ⊢R∗ ϕ. Applying the induction hypothesis, T ⊢R ϕ.
Now, given a theory T in L(R), define:
T0 = T
Ti+1 = (Ti)
∗ for i ∈ ω
Tω =
⋃
i∈ω Ti
R0 = R
Ri+1 = (Ri)
∗ for i ∈ ω
Rω =
⋃
i∈ω Ri
Lemma A.10 (Henkin). Let R be at least countably infinite and T be a theory in L(R). Then
Tω is a Henkin theory that is a conservative extension of T .
Proof. Take a closed ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(Rω). Then there exists i ∈ ω such that ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(Ri). But
then there is a witness rϕ ∈ L(Ri+1) ⊆ L(Rω) such that
¬(∀r)ϕ→ ¬ϕ[rϕ/r] ∈ Ti+1 ⊆ Tω .
So Tω is a Henkin theory.
By induction on i ∈ ω, we prove that Ti is a conservative extension of T . Base case: T0 = T
and the result is immediate. Induction step: Ti+1 is a conservative extension of Ti by Lemma A.9;
that is, Ti+1 ∩ L(Ri) = Ti. By the induction hypothesis, Ti ∩ L(R) = T . But then, since L(R) ⊆
L(Rj) ⊆ L(Rk) if j < k, we have
Ti+1 ∩ L(R) = (Ti+1 ∩ L(Ri)) ∩ L(R) = Ti ∩ L(R) = T .
So each Ti is a conservative extension of T . But then
Tω ∩ L(R) = (
⋃
i∈ω Ti) ∩ L(R) =
⋃
i∈ω(Ti ∩ L(R)) = T ,
which shows that Tω is a conservative extension of T .
By the usual Lindenbaum argument (using Zorn’s Lemma) [16, §3.1], for each R, any consistent
set in L(R) may be extended to a maximal L(R)-consistent set. Hence for a consistent theory T in
L(R), the theory Tω in L(Rω) is consistent and may be extended to a maximal L(Rω)-consistent set
T ′ω. This set is a theory in L(Rω). Further, this theory is Henkin because Tω ⊆ T
′
ω, both theories
are in the same language, Tω is Henkin by Lemma A.10, and any extension of a Henkin theory
within the same language is still Henkin (because all Henkin axioms are already present).
To prove completeness of QRBB, we take θ such that QRBB 0 θ. We construct a structure
Mc = (W, [·], N, V ) as in the proof of Theorem A.1 except that our set of worlds W is defined
differently. First, let M0 be the set of all maximal L(R)-consistent sets; each such set is a theory
in L(R). For each theory T ∈ M0, define Mω(T ) to be the set of all maximal L(Rω)-consistent
extensions of Tω. As we have seen, each member of Mω(T ) is a maximal L(Rω)-consistent Henkin
theory that is conservative over T (Lemma A.10). Define the set
M :=
⋃
T∈M0
Mω(T )
whose members are maximal L(Rω)-consistent extensions of Tω for some T ∈ M0. It follows that
{¬θ} can be extended to a T θ ∈ M0 and hence neither Mω(T
θ) nor M is empty. We define
W := M × {1, 2} and write (Γ, i) ∈ W in the abbreviated form Γi. Since M is nonempty, W is
nonempty. The remaining components of Mc are defined as in the proof of Theorem A.1 except
that all language-specific aspects of definitions are extended to the larger language L(Rω).
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The proof that Mc satisfies (pr), (d), and (rb) is as in the proof of Theorem A.1. So all that
remains is to prove the Truth Lemma: for each formula ϕ ∈ L(Rω) and world Γi ∈ W , we have
ϕ ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= ϕ. The proof is by induction on the construction of formulas. The arguments
for all but two cases are as in the proof of Theorem A.1. All that remains are the equality and
quantifier inductive step cases.
• Inductive step: (s = r) ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= s = r.
By (EP) and (EN), we have (s = r) ∈ Γ iff s = r. But the latter holds iff Mc,Γi |= s = r.
• Inductive step: (∀r)ϕ ∈ Γ iff Mc,Γi |= (∀r)ϕ.
If (∀r)ϕ ∈ Γ, then it follows by maximal L(Rω)-consistency and (UI) that ϕ[s/r] ∈ Γ for each
s ∈ Rω that is free for r in ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, we have Mc,Γi |= ϕ[s/r] for each
such s ∈ R. But this is what it means to have Mc,Γi |= (∀r)ϕ.
Conversely, if Mc,Γi |= (∀r)ϕ, then it follows that Mc,Γi |= ϕ[s/r] for all s ∈ Rω free for r
in ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, we have ϕ[s/r] ∈ Γ for all such s. Since Γ is a Henkin
theory, there is a Henkin constant rϕ ∈ Rω for ¬(∀r)ϕ. Hence ϕ[rϕ/r] ∈ Γ. But Γ contains
the Henkin axiom
¬(∀r)ϕ→ ¬ϕ[rϕ/r] ,
and so we have by L(Rω)-consistency that (∀r)ϕ ∈ Γ.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. To complete the proof of completeness, we recall
that we obtained T θ ∈ M0 as a maximal L(R)-consistent extension of {¬θ}. Hence there exists
Γθ ∈ Mω(T
θ) ⊆ M . But Γθ is a maximal L(Rω)-consistent extension of (T
θ)ω, and (T
θ)ω is a
conservative extension of T θ by Lemma A.10. Therefore, since θ /∈ T θ by consistency, we have
θ /∈ Γθ. Applying the Truth Lemma, Mc,Γ
θ
1 6|= θ. Completeness follows.
A.8 Conservativity of QRBB Over RBB
As a corollary of Theorems A.1 and A.5, we have the following.
Corollary A.11. QRBB is a conservative extension of RBB: for each ϕ ∈ F ,
QRBB ⊢ ϕ iff RBB ⊢ ϕ .
Proof. The right-to-left direction is obvious (QRBB contains all the axioms and rules of RBB). The
left-to-right direction follows by QRBB soundness (Theorem A.5) and RBB completeness (Theo-
rem A.1).
A.9 QRBBσ and QRBB
+
σ Soundness and Completeness
Recalling the semantics for QRBBσ and for QRBB
+
σ from §A.3, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem A.12 (QRBBσ and QRBB
+
σ Soundness and Completeness). Assume R contains the
symbol σ.
• QRBBσ is sound: QRBBσ ⊢ ϕ implies |=σ ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F
∀.
• if R is at least countably infinite, then QRBBσ is sound and complete: for each ϕ ∈ F
∀,
QRBBσ ⊢ ϕ iff |=σ ϕ .
• analogous soundness and completeness results hold for QRBB+σ with respect to the satisfaction
relation |=+σ .
Soundness is proved as in Theorem A.2. Completeness is proved as in Theorem A.5, except
that provability is taken with respect to either QRBBσ or QRBB
+
σ and one must show (using an
argument as in the completness portion of Theorem A.2) that Mc satisfies the relevant properties.
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